nature's standing

In 10th century Iraq, a remarkable Sufi parable was penned. It told the tale of a lawsuit that the animals of the world brought against humanity. The animals claimed that they were enslaved and mistreated. They spoke of the horrors and injustice they endured as they were beaten and burdened and eaten by their oppressors.

Set in a palatial court of law on the crest of an island mountain, the proceedings permitted animals and people to plead their cases before the Spirit King.

What is perhaps most stunning in this wildly woven tale, is the assumption that animals, and by extension all nature, can claim to have divine, inalienable, rights. And what's more, that these rights can stand toe to toe against the rights of humanity.

What is being argued, it seems, is the quality and extent, not the presence, of those rights.

Almost 40 years ago, Christopher D. Stone, Professor of Law at the University of Southern California, penned an article in the California Law Review that stands to this day as a landmark in legal thought. He asked the unthinkable question: should nature have standing in a court of law, in our legal tradition, and affect the way we adjudicate our cases on torts and recompense.

His answer was yes. Trees, natural objects, discrete areas (streams, fields) can claim rights in the court of law to be protected. In generally accessible language so that even a layperson like me can mostly understand, he outlines three conditions that must be met when nature is given standing:

1) Claims can be made directly on nature's behalf. That is, harm done to a stream or field or tree is enough to bring suit. No human need first claim to be directly harmed before this claim can go to court.

2) Nature's own unique damages (and not those of owners or other interested human or economic parties) may be considered. If someone pollutes upstream, even if there is no human downstream who can claim direct harm, friends of the stream can bring suit to redress the damages to the stream itself.

3) Nature itself needs to be compensated for the harm done to it. That is, nature itself, and not just its owner, must be the beneficiary of award. Clearly, the award then is not money, but the cessation and remediation of the harm.

This position is still shocking to many today. We still largely argue that it is people directly harmed by pollutants and natural destruction who have the right to protest in court and not those who fight on behalf of nature itself.

Of course, this is a spurious distinction, for if nature is harmed, we too are harmed.

And yes there are questions regarding how far and how broadly such rights of nature would be applied. But I would prefer that that be the arena of our dispute, that is, how far do the rights of nature go, rather than does nature have rights.

For the bottom line is, she does. And she will claim those rights somewhere down the line if we do not protect them now. Only, if we get to the point where she has had enough and calls in her chits, it won't be pretty.